. This broader approach may be applied to former Yugoslavia, to take in not only those who crossed state borders during the 1990s' wartime upheaval, but also many others who were still left with multiple, and sometimes irreconcilable, identities, since Yugoslavia's disintegration and the reinterpretation of formerly-domestic phenomena engendered many ambiguities and tensions also experienced by transnational migrants.
Former Yugoslavia and Transnational Cultural Spaces
With the disintegration of Yugoslavia, musical activities which had previously taken place within one domestic market were necessarily re-contextualized as transnational flows of information, culture, and capital. In parallel with the political changes in Croatia and Serbia following the death of the Croatian president Franjo Tudjman in 1999 and the fall of the Serbian president Slobodan Milošević in 2000, the extension of cultural contacts enabled now-transnational musical relations between the two successor states to be re-established as legitimate recording, distribution and performance activities rather than the 'underground' practices they had largely been throughout the 1990s. This paper focuses on the re-establishment period between 2000 and 2004, when decisions whether or not to perform 'across the border' were invested with political significance by musicians and the media. At stake, from a Croatian viewpoint, was whether the national cultural space should continue to be defined by the enclosed, nationalising criteria of the 1990s, and to what extent it should accommodate newly-transnational cultural products which connoted the Yugoslav era or a present-day ethnic Other.
The concept of a transnational community employed here follows Ulf Hannerz in encompassing a "fairly continuous negotiation of meanings, values, and symbolic forms […] involving the cultures of the old place and the new place" (Hannerz, 1996, pp. 99-100) . Analyzing migration alone, also acknowledges other ways in which transnational flows of people, capital, or cultural products may influence individual identities (Jackson, Crang, Dwyer, 2004, p. 2) . This broader approach may be applied to former Yugoslavia, to take in not only those who crossed state borders during the 1990s' wartime upheaval, but also many others who were still left with multiple, and sometimes irreconcilable, identities, since Yugoslavia's disintegration and the reinterpretation of formerly-domestic phenomena engendered many ambiguities and tensions also experienced by transnational migrants.
Moreover, post-Yugoslav cultural spaces have also witnessed the "transnational syncretism" described by Thomas Faist as the "diffusion of culture and [the] emergence of new types -mixed identities" (Faist, 2000, p. 201) . Allowance must be made here for those whose displacement was a matter of "symbolic and imaginary" geography rather than the "material" kind (Jackson, Crang, Dwyer, 2004, p. 3) .
Alongside the familiar concept of spatial transnationalism, indeed, there may also exist a temporal form, shaped by pronounced discontinuity between the new state narratives and some individuals' personal experience. Such individuals, just like those who are more conventionally the stock-in-trade of transnational studies, were obliged to negotiate their conflicting identities and -albeit temporally rather than spatiallyplaced in the same circumstances of existing simultaneously in more than one social field.
One typology of approaches to transnationalism includes its function as a means of "cultural reproduction" (Vertovec, 1999, p. 451 ) -a suitable departure-point to analyze popular music's position in the (spatial and temporal) transnationalism of former Yugoslavia. For other theorists too, "the collective enjoyment of cultural events and goods" constitutes a definite aspect of transnationalism (Portes, Guarnizo, Landolt, 1999, p. 221) . Popular music is a significant form in this respect: not only do individual consumers select "meanings, pleasures and social identities" by choosing one musical product over another (Fiske, 1987, p. 311 ), but they also express their identities socially by making value judgements about music (Russell, 1997, p. 151 ), using particular allusions as "boundary-markers" to project definitions of one's own group and of others' (Cohen, 1985, p. 12) . Musical figures who are now considered to be transnational play a particularly strong part in this symbolism. Furthermore, the representations in the texts of "a mass-mediated image culture" may be highly revealing of socio-political ideology (Kellner, 1995, p. 60) ; and the controversies surrounding transnational musical activity -particularly in Croatia -have indeed offered insights into the formation of the national ethnopolitical discourse, and of similar discourses of identity.
The full matrix of former Yugoslav transnational musical flows is at least six-sided, but this paper focuses on the relationship between Croatian and Serbian musical products. This paper first reviews Croatian musical activity in Serbia and Montenegro, and Serbian musical activity in Croatia, before concentrating on Croatia to examine how certain musicians with (licit or illicit) transnational audiences have become symbolic resources for constructing a number of possible Croatian identities.
Finally, it discusses the position of newly-composed folk music as itself a transnational cultural form.
Croatian Musical Activity in Serbia-Montenegro and Slovenia
Croatian artists' decisions to perform in Serbia and Montenegro have also provoked polemics; indeed, even just after Franjo Tudjman's death in December 1999, too many performances 'across the border' might still have risked a mainstream pop- (Lacko, 1999) . 3 While offering a lucrative commercial opportunity, the Montenegrin appearance provoked the influential president of the Croatian Musicians' Union (HGU), Paolo Sfeci, to remark that Dragović should "think about whether and how much her decision will have an effect on her career and image in Croatia" (Djilas, 1999) , 4 and inflicted long-term damage to Dragović's following among Hajduk Split's Torcida fan-club (Gall, 2001a) . Earlier in the decade, singing the 1992 patriotic song 'Dajem ti srce' ('I give you my heart'), Dragović had assimilated into her performance persona the maternal gender role inherent in Tudjman's conception of the nation (Senjković, 2002, p. 149) , where a woman's primary duty was to bear children for the national collective and ensure the historical continuity of the Croat people. These associations may partly account for Dragović's position at the centre of the scandal.
At the height of this case, Alka Vuica (another invited performer) wrote an article for the Croatian weekly Nacional describing it as "the ultimate hypocrisy" to attack singers while Croatian entrepreneurs had re-established commercial (and sporting) relations with Serbia in all other respects (Djilas, 1999) . Vuica, too, has been affected by her early willingness to perform in Serbia and Montenegro, and has arguably been more popular there than in her home country. This may be explained by her affection for overtly 'Balkan' musical elements and her frequent use of Serbian, Macedonian, Greek, and Turkish motifs and cover versions, aligning her with the "popular Balkan (counter) culture" described by Alexander Kiossev which celebrates such elements as positive signs of identification (Kiossev, 2002, pp. 184-5) . 5 This, and her level of cultural-political engagement (which is unusual on the Croatian popular music scene), marks her as distinct in a cultural environment suffused with ambivalence towards the concept of the Balkans.
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Yet little or no reaction was provoked by the Belgrade concerts a year later by Darko
Rundek and the punk band KUD Idijoti (Grujičić, 2000) . However, these artists belong to the rock discourse, where performers and consumers may define their product against both mass-market showbusiness and nationalistic chauvinism, 7 while zabavna singers, far more dependent on mass-media channels, are far more vulnerable to their disapproval. Vuica's treatment of popular music as another aspect of commercial relations overlooks its cherished symbolic value as the cultural space of a national community, emphasized in the attempts made to establish certain genres as symbols of Croat, Serb, or Muslim identity (Laušević, 2000, pp. 293-4 Sad (Goreta, 2002) .
The significance of performances in Serbia continued to be understood in Croatia on a deeper level than the purely commercial, and a small number of artists, including
Giuliano (a member of the far-right Croatian Party of Right (HSP)) and Mate Mišo Kovač (whose son died early in the war in Croatia), have refused outright to perform there (Marinović, 2001; Blažević, 2004 (Strukar, 2003b) . The process has been assisted by the regularization of discographic activity: rather than being re-sold in pirate editions as in the 1990s, Croatian CDs and cassettes are now produced under licence by Serbian record companies, who frequently commit artists to promotional appearances. However, the amount of coverage this receives by the Croatian media is not commensurate with the performers' Serbian popularity.
Recording and performance activity in Serbia itself no longer brings the opprobrium of the immediate post-Tudjman era, but still represents a parallel career for Croatian artists, with success in Serbia rarely presented as a matter of course in the public personae they offer to the domestic media.
The transnational reach of TV Pink, based in Serbia (where the channel has been strongly associated since the Milošević era with showbusiness-folk music, but also with the introduction of 1990s music-video production values into Serbian music promotion (Kronja, 2001, pp. 42-5) ) but available on satellite throughout the exYugoslav region, is one example of modern entertainment media's ability to frustrate the establishment of separate national cultural spaces. 9 Another is the emergence of Macedonian artists are aggregated into a conceptual whole which reinforces Slovenes' perception of distinctiveness from the other ex-Yugoslav peoples (Velikonja, 2002, p. 189), but also their consciousness of having in the past belonged to the Yugoslav community. 10 Regardless of the extent to which Croatian identity is also defined against a nebulous 'Balkan' Other (Razsa and Lindstrom, 2004, p. 639 comparison between 1980s and contemporary music promotion is problematic.
Serbian and Other Ex-Yugoslav Musical Activity in Croatia
Even when most Croatian performers had become reconciled to viewing Serbia as another site of commercial operations, cultural flows in the opposite direction organizers, headed by Paolo Sfeci, to amend the regulations so that prizes could only be won by Croatian citizens (Oremović, 2002) .
Industry resistance to ex-Yugoslav performers appearing in Croatia on equal terms may on one level be understood as a commercially protectionist response. Such a tactic would aim to maintain the privileged treatment enjoyed by early-1990s Croatian artists when other republics' artists were withdrawn from the state media and Croatian singers became insulated from potential Serbian competition. Indeed, critiques of contemporary Croatian popular music frequently allege that the artificial advantage encouraged complacency among music producers and elevated mediocre talents into national stars (e.g. Gall, 2000) . The early 1990s' climate has been vividly described by Dubravka Ugrešić as an element of the Tudjmanist "confiscation of memory"
immediately noticed in everyday life (Ugrešić, 1998, p. 228 ). This represented a deliberate strategy by the ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) to re-align Croats' "symbolic universe" by removing from the historical and cultural spheres any reminder that Croatians had belonged to the national community of the former Yugoslav state: the political aim was to eliminate and stigmatize any allegiance other than to the regime which had secured Croatian independence (Zakošek, 2000, p. 110) .
Purely commercial explanations therefore seem insufficient to account for the behaviour of industry professionals who had benefited throughout the 1990s from HDZ patronage. Both during and after the Tudjman era, opposition to performances in Croatia by Serbian artists was led by Sfeci, whose continued loyalty to Tudjmanist ideology is suggested by his statement regarding a parliamentary proposal to liberalize the work-permit regime that it would be "excellent news for all Yugoslavs and regionalists" (Gatarić & Vuković, 2002) . The Serbian musicians who 'returned'
to Croatia under Tudjman were exclusively alternative rockers, including Rambo
Amadeus (Vuković, 1998) , and they first played in Istria and Rijeka, regions which have taken pride in multi-ethnicity and tolerance as a characteristic of their identity to the extent that their inhabitants define themselves partially against other, less tolerant, Croats (Kalapoš, 2002, p. 84) . Zagreb, then the only other venue for Serbian performances, was still understood as more likely to provoke an adverse reaction, or even violence such as that against a 1996 Zabranjeno pušenje concert (Perić, 1996) .
Croatian fans of Serbian artists often travelled to their Slovenian concerts instead, conferring on Slovenia a certain status as a liminal space for Croatian consumers of alternative cultural models. Djordje Balašević, among the most popular of them, was able to attract up to 10 000 Croatians to his frequent concerts in Ljubljana, Maribor, and Portorož (Peršić, 2001 (Peršić, 2000) . Balašević, whose pre-war popularity had been greatest in Croatia and Slovenia, performed his first solo concert in independent Croatia in June 2001 at the Pula Arena (Dobrila, 2001) , and his first Zagreb concert in December 2002 (Pribačić & Mamić, 2002 (Jajčinović, 2002) , but also on his early associations with the Yugoslav regime, particularly through his 1977 song 'Računajte na nas' ('Count on us') which declared the younger generation's loyalty to Tito and the heritage of the Partisan movement (Gugo, 2000) . 14 Yet Balašević's supporters too invested him with immense symbolic value, and anticipated his Croatian concerts "as a therapeutic séance and a symbolic beginning of a certain more civilized phase in Croatian-Serbian relations" (Gall, 2003b) .
Typical in this respect were the words of Dražen Turina-Šajeta after the Mercator concert in Pula: Turina, himself a rock musician associated with Istria, 15 took it as a sign that "things are slowly coming back to normal", took note of audience members moved to tears, and wished that Sfeci and other opponents of Balašević "were there too to cry as well at the disintegration of their ideal" (Turina, 2000) . One transnationalism theorist mentions in passing that "persons cannot be Yugoslavs when Yugoslavia is gone" (Berezin, 2003, p. 11) , but, on the contrary, Balašević's fan-base may provide the clearest example of post-Yugoslav musical transnationalism: they manifest not only the "common identity" underpinning many transnational networks but the participation in "socio-cultural […] activities" with which such networks are formed and perpetuated (Vertovec, 2001, p. 573) . Indeed, one anthropologist's exYugoslav informants experienced the former Yugoslavia as precisely "a cultural everyday space", composed of various collective rituals and cultural markers (Volčič, 2003, p. 15) .
The major accusation against both Balašević and his fans was 'Yugo-nostalgia': in Croatian political life, this concept had served as a catch-all insult for any individual or idea which failed to correspond to Tudjmanist ideology and which was therefore assumed to self-evidently prefer the inimical previous regime (Ugrešić, 1998, p. 231 ).
The Croatian nationalist project, politically striving to emphasize its distance from the ideological structure it had replaced, denied any distinction between political and individual/generational nostalgia, and consciously encroached into private memory to demand overt rejection of any positive memories of common Yugoslav life (Drakulić, 1996, p. 147) .
Before his 2001 Pula concert, Balašević explicitly distinguished the "normal emotional human nostalgia" he was experiencing in Istria from the "nationalistic, territorial, or some Serbian or Yugoslav sense" with which a political nostalgic would mourn (Peršić, 2001) . Similarly, Zlatko Gall, describing his own new-found appreciation of Balašević, wrote that such nostalgia was in no way subversive, "because emotional Yugo-nostalgia is completely legitimate […] and because of the fundamental right to one's own and one's generation's past" (Gall, 2003b) . where the use of national-historical symbolism is particularly striking, invite a further study of the bases of musical preferences and Croatian identity.
Transnational Cultural Flows as Symbolic Resources
The coincidence of Balašević's 2001 concert with the summer of nationalist protests against General Mirko Norac's trial for war crimes (where the typical slogan on protestors' placards read "We are all Mirko Norac") led fans from Split to travel to Pula with banners and T-shirts reading "We are all Djordje Balašević" (Šarac & Jelaca, 2001) . 16 Balašević has symbolic value on several grounds: his socio-musical position as a pop-rock singer who -apparently like much of his audiencedisapproves of the dominance of newly-composed folk music (Gordy, 1999, p. 107 (Bougarel, 1999, p. 165 instance, had employed an essentialized conception of the Mediterranean on that occasion to underline how foreign such chauvinism was to Split's supposedly authentic nature, contrasting "the winds from the south" with "all their mildness and the beauty of the Mediterranean" against the recent arrival of "implacability, rudeness, [and] intolerance" carried on "the brutal, cold winds from Dinara" (Kučić, 2002) . Accordingly, a Bajaga concert in Split took on added symbolic value as a reaffirmation of old-Split values against the nationalist Herzegovinan influx. Only two months earlier, in fact, one journalist from the Split daily Slobodna Dalmacija had expressed resentment of the fact that Serbian performers were avoiding Split "because it would be like pushing their hand into a hornet's nest when it doesn't want them there" (Ljubičić, 2003) . The attack on Bajaga's concert was understood as also directed against "all those who -regardless of their place of birth -in Split today feel like the captives of other people's hate, xenophobia and primitivism" (Gall, 2003a) .
Coverage in the Rijeka-based Novi list, with a cosmopolitan urban readership, made exceptionally explicit use of the discourse when Zoran Krželj wrote that Split had thereby "once again stayed (or become) a village, that latest, backwoods Balkan
[kind]" (Krželj, 2003) .
The heavy-handed police treatment of victims, according to Krželj, provoked the crowd on a night of symbolic resistance into chanting the Električni orgazam song 'Igra rokenrol cela Jugoslavija' ('All Yugoslavia is dancing rock-and-roll') (Krželj, 2003) . 19 This prompted further reflections on the Tudjmanist and post-Tudjman
Croatian state as institutionally chauvinist, and "gave added strength to the impression that this city is lost for the civilized, for that so-called silent, civic majority" (Petranović, 2003b) . Another commentary described the incident as "the logical consequence of a decade in which a parallel history of Split has been told with hate speech", mentioning the official blind eye turned to memorial masses for Ante Pavelić, a Split street named after the Ustaša ideologue Mile Budak, or Ustaša insignia displayed on the Riva (Gall, 2003a ). The Bajaga case demonstrates that these Croatians' established urban values may be expressed through a transnational identification as a mark of tolerance. Yet, the transnational consumption of another musical genre, newly-composed folk music, is associated in this discourse with the supposedly rural-in-urban population itself, providing an example of how identities can be shaped and re-asserted through expressing value judgements in social interaction (see Jenkins, 1996, p. 4) . The judgements of similarity and difference on which this method of identity-formation is founded depend on a community's "symbolic repertoire", with reference to which its members "suppose themselves to be more like each other than like the members of other communities" (Cohen, 1985, p. 21) , and to which musical products may make a significant contribution (Edensor, 2002, p. 25) . Urban-Croatian insecurity concerning rural-to-urban migration demands that Serbian folk singers' reception there should be considered separately from that of pop-rock stars.
The Transnationalism of Folk: Serbia-Croatia-Herzegovina
Unlike the cases discussed above, the Zagreb concert in November 2004 of Željko Joksimović, the first large-scale performance given by a Serbian performer associated in Croatia with folk (Dervoz 2004b ), 20 attracted neither violent incidents nor antagonistic newspaper reports detailing the singer's politically-connected past. 21 Coverage described a "euphoric", mainly young audience (Mamić, 2004) , with the only discordant note being struck by the Slobodna Dalmacija reporter who employed an all too telling metaphor in concluding that the Serbian star was hoping to, "after the other neighbours, subjugate the Croatian market too" (Marušić, 2004 ). Joksimović's arrival may represent a particularly significant development, since Serbian folk music has typically been marginalized -although far from absent -on the Croatian musical market.
Serbian folk artists were not promoted through the Croatian broadcast media (although TV Pink and the Karić Brothers channel are available to Croatian satellite-TV subscribers), although they were occasionally profiled in print (e.g. Strukar, 2003a) . Their recordings were not sold in mainstream outlets, and were mainly available through pirate vendors. Vesna Zmijanac estimated that some of her records had sold up to 40 000 copies in Croatia in pirate editions (Šćepanović, 2003) , 22 while a 1995 investigation had suggested similar figures for Zmijanac, Dragana Mirković, and Lepa Brena and noted that "even the hated Ceca" (the widow of the assassinated paramilitary commander Željko Ražnatović-Arkan) had sold 18 000 pirate cassettes (Djilas, 1996) . Such figures, in a market where sales of 10 000 copies could be a rarity (Gall, 2000) , were of some anxiety to the Croatian music industry as part of its concern with piracy in general. Folk concerts predominantly took place in small clubs and bars, particularly the Ludnica and Od sumraka do zore/Pasha discotheques in Zagreb, Oks in Osijek, and several venues in Split. Even in 1990, venues in Zagreb playing newly-composed folk music had already enjoyed underground popularity, thanks to their appeal as a culturally illicit form of entertainment (Rasmussen, 2002, pp. 184-5) , and this again appears to be the case in post-Tudjman Croatia.
However, Serbian folk singers' concerts normally occurred below the threshold of media attention, apart from a spring 2002 edition of the talk-show Latinica which dealt with the subject and featured the Serbian folk singer Miroslav Ilić on his first post-war tour of Croatia (Stanivuković, 2002 (Greenberg, 2006, p. 142) , continue to make her perceived as unsuitable to perform in Croatia. Nonetheless, she too enjoys an underground following, supposedly so much so that the image of nationalist Croats hypocritically blasting Ceca's music from their cars has become a cliché of Croatian discourse (Ljubičić, 2003; Petranović, 2003a) . Nonetheless, this image's very frequency suggests that it may be underpinned by symbolically-based social value judgements -which frown upon such overtly-displayed nationalism by aligning it with this 'most Serbian', most Othered, Serbian performer.
Joksimović, however, transcended this framework after attaining high levels of recognition among the Croatian audience with his second place in the 2004
Eurovision Song Contest -helped by maximum points from the Croatian public 'televote'. The entirely unexpected result occasioned much comment both in Croatia and in the Serbian press (Trajković, 2004) , and paved the way for Joksimović's Zagreb performance, 23 when one headline observed that he had "opened the borders to ex-Yu music" (Mikac, 2004) . In 2004, it remained too early to assess whether Joksimović had done so. Concerts by Serbian artists including Bajaga, Balašević, Zdravko Čolić, Dragana Mirković, and Indira Radić took place thereafter in Croatia amid little media comment, suggesting that they were no longer a notorious noveltyespecially when they were by pop-rock or zabavna stars rather than folk performers.
Even the appearance of Lepa Brena, the most emblematic newly-composed folk singer of socialist Yugoslavia (Ugrešić, 1998, p. 231 (Mamić, 2005) : apparently Ceca's unsuitability extended even to representing her in the discourse of showbusiness personality rather than in that of wartime and political guilt. In this instance, at least, the boundaries of the Croatian cultural space are being consistently marked by excluding Ražnatović and her ethno-political connotations.
Another transnational musical product also figures strongly in the Croatian symbolic Thompson" (Brajčić, 2004) . As became evident in the discussions of local identity in Split, the discourses surrounding Thompson himself are an even more acute example of many urban Croats' ambivalence to cultural markers associated with the Dinara region transected by the Croatian-Bosnian border.
Thompson has consistently embraced 'Dinaric' musical signifiers, and indeed his style has become paradoxically characterised by the Macedonian-style 7/8 beat first incorporated into rock music by Goran Bregović's Bijelo dugme (Gall, 2002a) . Niko
Bete's song 'Mirko Norac', dedicated to the general indicted for war crimes, is likewise set to the 7/8 rhythm. 27 Following the violence against Zabranjeno pušenje in 1996, Paolo Sfeci had stated that the incident had "only shown that there is no place for the eastern [istočnjački] melos in Croatia!" (Perić, 1996) . In some right-wing imaginaries, however, such antagonism can be waived to accommodate these hyper- Anthony Cohen speculates that "structural forms" appropriated from elsewhere may still "become new vehicles for the expressions of indigenous meanings", and even "for the reassertion and symbolic expression of the community's boundaries" (Cohen, 1985, p. 37) , and this would appear to hold true for Thompson and Bete. However, the suffusion of anti-patriotic-showbusiness discourses with a wider Croatian ambivalence towards newly-composed folk music and so-called 'eastern' musical elements leads one to reflect on a deeper level at which transnational flows have operated in the post-Yugoslav environment: the supposed influence of Serbian showbusiness-folk on Croatian musical production.
Showbusiness Folk Music as a Transnational Form
Serbian performers, as noted in the first sections of this paper, were subject to hostility and setbacks in 1990s Croatia: yet even then, the popularity of newlycomposed folk music (NCFM) could be said to have been sustained, or even increased. In the Yugoslav era, this genre had mainly been associated with Serbia and Bosnia (Rasmussen, 2002, p. 95) . During the 1990s, however, certain techniques from NCFM became apparent in Croatian pop production, a development which was viewed by certain professional critics and musicians as transgressing the boundaries of musically-expressed Croatian identity. The approaches taken towards folkinfluenced zabavna music and its apparent 'eastern melos' indicate how the transnational phenomenon of showbusiness-folk was incorporated or denied as an element of Croatian cultural space.
During the 1980s, the use of electronic instrumentation and pop-style promotion in newly-composed folk music had culminated in the repertoire of performers such as Lepa Brena. Brena based herself in Serbia after the disintegration of Yugoslavia and, along with her colleagues, was then excluded from the Croatian market. One Croatian ethnomusicologist takes pains to stress that NCFM was not an established Croatian genre before 1991 (or, implicitly, afterwards), emphasizing instead Croatia's affinity to zabavna music, tamburica-pop, 28 and "Anglo-American-style pop and rock" (Ceribašić, 2000, pp. 227-8 ). Yet, even though NCFM was mainly released by other republics' record companies, a Croatian audience still existed, and individual Croatian producers had begun to experiment with the so-called 'eastern melos' even in the Ukraden (a Bosnian Serb singer from Sarajevo) as "a pioneering attempt to introduce the folk sound into pop music" (Luković, 1989, p. 277) .
Thus the Croatian fusion of zabavna schlager with NCFM elements was not, as some critiques imply, concocted from nothing after Croatia's independence. Nonetheless, it gathered greater pace in the 1990s, when it was proverbially epitomised by Huljić, (Dragićević-Šešić, 1994, pp. 205-6) or to convey images of romantic and family life (Čolović, 1985, pp. 185-6) .
The most frequent Croatian critique of this trend directly connects it with the early 1990s, arguing that the removal of Serbian cultural products from the media created a commercial opportunity to fulfil consumers' demands by providing a new stable of artists whose Croatianness was not in question, and who would perform "pseudofolkloric schlager" to replace "its 'newly-composed' aesthetic eastern relative" (Gall, 2000) . An extreme example of this ambivalence is given in an anecdote retold by Dubravka Ugrešić, who writes that an unknown Croatian female singer re-recorded a number of songs by Neda Ukraden (by then living in Serbia) -ostensibly to return the work of Ukraden's Croatian songwriters to "the corpus of Croatian pop" (Ugrešić, 1998, pp. 140-1) , but perhaps also as another attempt to turn Croatians' ambiguous relationship with narodnjaci to commercial advantage. autochthonous Croatian products"; continuing the eastern-related symbolism, the clients of Tonči Huljić were described as renegades or "poturice", a word connoting Christian converts to Islam during the wars with the Ottoman Empire (Dragaš, 2004) .
Even when these allusions are employed as a knowing metaphor, the inherent symbolism remains highly significant.
If international popular music styles in Croatia enable a sense of belonging to a global community (Kalapoš, 2002, p. 90) , much of the unease surrounding the folk-based turn in Croatian music may involve a perception that it connects national culture to a more limited 'Balkan' community and to the ruralized-urban culture from which NCFM originated (Rasmussen, 2002, p. 200) . Describing Serbian music, Eric Gordy understands the folk element of Serbian 'turbofolk' as primarily a "sociological" category, where folk is constructed according to "other basic social oppositions: the urban against the rural and semiurban publics, and as a parallel, rock and roll against folk" (Gordy, 1999, pp. 135-6) . In the same vein, Milena Dragićević-Šešić describes NCFM as enabling "a person with a traditional structure of thought and feeling [who] otherwise feels alienated and rejected" in the city to relieve their alienation with a musical product which corresponds to that familiar, traditional structure despite its modern or even exotic orchestration (Dragićević-Šešić 1994, p. 57) . If NCFM provides a means for its listeners to escape full submission to the values of the cityand its opponents certainly appear to understand it thus -then unease about its popularity may ultimately imply anxiety for the universalism, or otherwise, of individual consciousness in Croatian society.
In terms of politics, Dunja Rihtman-Auguštin considered that the use of nationalism as a form of political mobilization in the 1980s had particular resonance for "the semiurban suburbs [and…] newly-settled residents of the centre", for whom the nation provided a framework which could connect a new and somewhat alien city identity to a more familiar local identity (Rihtman-Auguštin, 2000, pp. 29-30) . If it could be established that both musical producers and nationalist politicians were striving for the same target audience, there would be even more reason to investigate any harmony of thought or action between the music industry and political ideology in Croatia. 
Conclusion
Now that artists such as Joksimović and Severina understand their audience in transnational terms, it might be tempting to conclude that the popular music market of former Yugoslavia is turning full circle and repairing the trans-republican linkages interrupted by the consequences of disintegration. Anti-nationalist dissent has emphasized the persistence of personal memory throughout this process, implying the extent of resistance in the private sphere even when nationalising projects are complied with in public (e.g. Drakulić, 1996) and suggesting in passing that popular music is intimately related to this sphere of the everyday (Ugrešić, 1998, p. 133) .
33
From this perspective, it might be comforting to interpret the recent rapid growth of transnational consumption and production in ex-Yugoslav popular music as the repair of formerly-shared experiences. Yet this would overlook the effect of Croatia's 1990s
severance from Yugoslav cultural space, when Croatian musicians and consumers nonetheless confirmed their affinity for the transnational form of newly-composed folk music. In the late 1980s, Croatia's most successful musical exports to the rest of Yugoslavia had predominantly been zabavna performers such as Dragojević, Dragović, Novi fosili, Magazin, and Tereza Kesovija (Dragićević-Šešić, 1994, p. 106). These personalities have retained their popularity, but they have been joined (even outstripped?) by performers whose music approaches showbusiness-folk.
At the same time, music from the Yugoslav period which suddenly became transnational has also taken on new meanings in the identity narratives of younger generations, where the "Yugoslav imaginary" is indivisible from the "unique, culturally specific brand of rock'n'roll" produced in socialist Yugoslavia and the bands of the 1980s rock scene are conceptualised as "the cultural links between different [Yugoslav] nations" (Volčič, forthcoming, . This orientation does not hold true for all youth, and, indeed, the 'moral panics' which have ensued on the topic of Croatian teenagers listening to (Serbian) newly-composed folk or (Croatian) patriotic music (Perasović, 2006, p. 5) suggest that the symbolic opposition of 'folk'
and 'rock' (Prica, 1991; Gordy, 1999) performer most open to comparisons with Brena in this period was perhaps Maja
Šuput, who made great use of Brena's characteristic male backing-vocals and her typical lyrical themes of joy and entertainment -and was criticised on these grounds from a 'Balkanist' perspective (Strukar & Mamić 2003) . 33 On ethnological approaches to the reproduction of national (etc.) symbols in everyday life, see Kalapoš, 2002, pp. 11-12. 
